This paper uses cultural-historical activity theory to interpret the effects of bureaucratic standardization and formalization on software development work. I focus on the Software Engineering Institute's Capability Maturity Model. Under a more "mature" process, developers lose much of their traditional autonomy in deciding the methods of work, since these methods are largely standardized and formalized. Paralleling broader concerns about bureaucracy, some observers fear that process maturity will be experienced as coercive and burdensome, with negative consequences for staff motivation and development effectiveness. To explore whether these fears are well-founded, I studied four units of a large software consulting firm. I find that the fears are largely misplaced. It is true that process maturity replaced autonomy with a broad, tight web of interdependencies, and that sometimes these interdependencies were experienced as oppressive dependence. However, for most of my interviewees, interdependence took a more collaborative form. Most developers expressed a professional concern for the effectiveness of development, and embraced process maturity as an efficacious collective discipline. Compared to the traditional, individualistic, "hacker" mode of software production, process maturity made for a more "socialized" production process. The organization form associated with high maturity fit the "enabling bureaucracy" model described by Adler (//). The subjective experience of work took the form of more interdependent self-construals and more directly socialized identities.
PRACTICE AND PROCESS: THE SOCIALIZATION OF SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
To understand the organizational forms we observe around us, we need to understand the work practices that these forms are designed to support. As new organizational forms proliferate, work is therefore once again becoming a core concern of organizational research (Barley, 1996; Barley and Kunda, 2001) . And as interest in work grows, so too does the corresponding theoretical challenge: how best can we apprehend the nature of work itself and its links to both the organizational structure and to the lived experience of work?
This study focuses on software development work. Several divergent trends characterize software development; the present study concentrates on its bureaucratization -an increasing focus on "process," understood as the standardization and formalization of work procedures. The focus on process has emerged as one response to the "chaos" in software development (Standish, 1994) -the distressingly large proportion of large-scale systems development projects that fail to meet their goals or fail entirely (Gibbs, 1994; Lieberman and Fry, 2001) . In pursuit of greater control over this chaos, a growing number of organizations have adopted the Capability Maturity Model developed by the Software Engineering Institute (described in more detail below). The CMM recommends a TQMstyle standardization and formalization of the software process. This "software factory" approach promises considerably greater efficiency, timeliness, and quality (Harter, Krishnan, Slaughter, 2000 : Clark, 1999 Cusumano, 2000 ; on the concept of software factory, see Cusumano, 1991; Swanson et al, 1991; Griss, 1993 : Weber, 1997 Friedman and Cornford, 1989) .
Concerns, however, have been voiced about the CMM's bureaucratic nature. In particular, concern is often expressed that it will reduce the autonomy of developers and will therefore be experienced by them as burdensome and coercive constraint. This would stifle the commitment and creativity that are, over the longer run, required for high-quality and innovative software development (e.g. Crocca, 1992; Conradi and Fuggetta, 2002; Lynn, 1991) . Typical of opposition to standardized and formalized methodologies is this assessment by two well-respected software management experts: "Of course, if your people aren't smart enough to think their way through their work, the work will fail. No Methodology will help. Worse still, Methodologies can do grievous damage to efforts in which people are fully competent. They do this by trying to force the work into a fixed mold that guarantees a morass of paperwork, a paucity of methods, an absence of responsibility, and a general loss of motivation." (DeMarco and Lister, 1987, P. 116) One interviewee in the present study expressed the concern this way: "Programming has always been seen as more of an art form than a factory process. Programmers are supposed to be creative, free spirits, able to figure things out themselves. So the software factory idea was very alien to the culture of programmers." (Interviewee A-6)
The research reported here seeks to understand software development work under these more disciplined, factory-like, bureaucratic conditions. In doing so, I contribute to the broader theoretical challenge of conceptualizing work, organization, and subjectivity by showing the fruitfulness of an emerging theoretical perspective -cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT). Taking inspiration from Marx's concept of praxis (see, e.g., Bernstein) , CHAT is a variant of a broader class of practice-oriented theories (see e.g. Chaiklin and Lave, 1993) . Practice is an increasingly common starting point for research on work (Lave, 1988; Brown and Duguid, 2001; Martin et al., 1995) , and CHAT perhaps enables us to overcome some of the limitations of some currently popular versions.
In the sections that follow, I first present the CHAT framework. I then discuss the methods and the context of my research, providing some general background on the company and the four programs within it that are the focus of my research. The subsequent section presents my main findings, discussing the transformation of the software development process and this transformation's effects on the organization and on the individual's experience of work. A conclusion summarizes my main results and discusses their broader implications for the analysis of work and organization.
THE THEORETICAL CHALLENGE
Given that the objective of this research is to understand the impact of bureaucratization on software development work, what theoretical framework affords us the greatest potential insight?
One possible starting point would be the social psychology of autonomy and control. Autonomy is often presented as a key motivating characteristic of jobs (Hackman and Lawler,//) . A similar assumption underlies Ajzen's (1991) theory of planned behavior, with its focus on "perceived behavioral control." In the Information Systems field, a considerable body of research has focused on the role of perceived control and autonomy as determinants of the use of, and satisfaction with, new techniques and technologies (see for example Baronas, 1988; Mathieson, 1991; Taylor and Todd, 1995; Henderson, 1992; Green and Hevner, 1999) . As will be shown below, process maturity clearly implies a loss of autonomy for the individual developer; much organizational behavior theory would therefore expect strongly negative attitudinal effects: given the relatively uncertain nature of development tasks, these attitudinal effects would be expected to have negative business outcomes. This emphasis on autonomy seems particularly appropriate for programmers, who typically have low need for social interaction (Couger and O'Callaghan, 1994) .
On reflection, however, it would beg the question to take autonomy as a key variable. It is surely insufficient to characterize the bureaucratization of software work only by what is lost: we also need to understand what replaces that lost autonomy. Abstractly speaking, autonomy is replaced by greater interdependence. Autonomy/control theories assume that this interdependence typically takes an asymmetrical form, in other words, that autonomy is replaced by dependence and domination. But this assumption needs to be tested against reality, since it is possible that autonomy is replaced by a more congenial, symmetrical, and collaborative form of interdependence. Such a form of interdependence would likely be experienced very differently by employees and would likely generate very different organizational outcomes.
An alternative starting point, one more likely to capture the range of possible effects of a more interdependent process, would be role stress theory (Kahn et al, 1964; Goldstein and Rockart, 1984; Rasch and Tosi, 1992 .) According to Kahn et al. , the sources of stress are located in role conflict, ambiguity, and overload. These variables tap at least some aspects of the individual's experience of interdependence. Research has shown that formalization of work procedures often reduces stress and increases commitment, even for relatively professional occupations (Rizzo, House and Lirtzman, 1970; Jackson and Schuler, 1985; Organ and Greene, 1981; Podsakoff, Williams and Todor, 1986) .
Role stress theory, however, resembles autonomy/control theories in an important feature that undermines the value of both for the present task: they belong to a long tradition in social psychology that has sought to identity universal individual needs -here, the need for autonomy/control or stress reduction -and analyze responses to organizational context as a function of this context's effects on such needs. The critique advanced by Fiske et al. ( //: 918) applies to both these theories: "Most contemporary social psychological theorizing begins with an autonomous individual whose relationships are a means to certain asocial ends. [...] Consequently, social psychological theorizing often reflects a Western concern that the social group will somehow overwhelm or disempower the autonomous, agentic self." Such an individualistic starting point would beg the question, since context can shape needs. Cultural psychologists have found that in some other (macro) cultures, notably some Asian ones, people's "self-construals" often value interdependence over independence (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) . To account for how developers respond to interdependence, we need to understand their self-construals.
CHAT
In this article, I adopt a perspective that offers the beginnings of a theory that might better suit our needs: cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT). As developed by Engestrom (1987; and Cole (//) . CHAT is based largely on the work of Vygotsky (//), Luria (//), and Leont'ev (//) (other useful overviews of CHAT include: Engestrom et al., 1999; Chaiklin, et al., 1999; Wertsch, 1985; Blackler, 1993; Holt and Morris, 1993.) CHAT is distinctive first, in its unit of analysis, arguing that the most appropriate unit of analysis for the study of work situations is the activity, understood as the system of relations established when a collectivity pursues a common object. In the study of work, the activity is the "molar" unit of analysis, to be preferred over the individual's practice -since work is always embedded in a cultural-historical context and typically undertaken as a collective endeavor. Similarly, this unit of analysis is preferred over discrete psychological operations (quasi-automatic responses to stimuli) or actions (discrete goal-directed behaviors) because work is best understood as a collective endeavor that unfolds over historical time.
In Engestrom's development of CHAT, summarized in the chart presented in Exhibit 1, the structure of an activity system can be understood as a series of expansions of the fundamental dyad of psychology -stimulus and response, or object and subject. Starting with an individual or collective subject and their relation to the object of their activity, we note the following series of mediations: * Human activity is distinctive in its extensive reliance on tools (including concepts and language) as culturally transmitted artifacts that mediate the subject's relation to the object of activity. * The subject's relation to the object of activity is simultaneously mediated by the community within which the subject's activity is located -the collectivity of people who share the same object. * The community's relation to its object is mediated in turn by the division of labor, which specifies different roles for different parts of the community. * The individual's relation to this community is mediated by rules, which are the norms and conventions governing the behavior of individuals in the collectivity. * In some circumstances, actors in the activity system are aware of a potentially more advanced model of their activity, and this -along with other contradictions discussed below -can play a role in the evolution of the system, leading to a progressive "re-mediation" of its constituent elements.
[put Exhibit 1 about here] In the portrait I offer below of four software development organizations, "process maturity" appears in the software development activity system in various roles. By the time of my interviews in late 1999, the CMM had been adopted as a more advanced model. It had transformed people's understanding of the object of their work, and had thereby had a profound effect on all the elements of the activity system. The term "process" had thus come to signify sometimes a tool (when it guided the subject's relation to the object of work, for example, in specifying documentation requirements), sometimes a rule (when it defined the subject's relation to the community, for example, when it specified who needed to play what roles in the development process), and sometimes an object in itself (when people worked on defining or refining the process). Process maturity had had a profound effect too on the activity system's outcome (in its relations with other organizations), and had reshaped key features of the division of labor and of community. And through these effects on the "objective" elements of the activity system, process maturity efforts had had a profound influence on the "subjective" element -the developers themselves.
The body of this paper analyzes this process-mature software development activity system, taking in turn each element, or node, in Exhibit 1. Each sub-section first describes the central tendency imparted by process maturity at that node, then discusses the associated tensions. These tensions can be understood as resulting from the activity system's internal and external contradictions. Exhibit 1 is a model of what Marx calls "production in general" -the structure of productive activity abstracting from the specific form it takes in different social settings (Marx, 1973: 85) -and it is these contradictions that give a specific social form to the transhistorical model of production-in-general. In doing so, they impart to the activity system the distinctive dynamics of its development. (Following Marx, and prior to him, Hegel, CHAT takes contradictions as real -out there, in objective, independent reality -rather than purely notional, in the mind of the observer. Contradiction here is a relation between two real forces, not merely a logical relation between two propositions. As such, contradictions are the source of change.) Following Engestrom, I distinguish four types of contradiction, and in the analysis below, we will see examples of each. At each node, we find a primary contradiction between use-value and exchange-value -a contradiction endemic to capitalism. (Marx's argues that the commodity is the "germ cell" -the core -of capitalist production, and that the commodity is a contradictory unity of use-value -the practical use it has for the purchaser -and exchange-value -its power for the seller to command other commodities or money in exchange.) This contradiction underlies the tensions we find at each node. Secondary contradictions characterize relations between nodes. Tertiary contradictions are those between the form of the current activity system and a more advanced model of it. Quaternary contradictions are those between the given activity system and surrounding activity systems. Together, these drive the evolution of the activity system. Understanding them will allow us to delineate some scenarios for its future development.
METHODS AND CONTEXT

Research methods
The research was conducted in a large, U.S.-based professional service firm which I will call GCC. With the support of senior management, interviews were conducted with staff in four of its programs involved in government work. ("Programs" at GCC are organizational units devoted to long-standing, multi-project client engagements.) The choice of these programs was guided by a research strategy that sought to identify the effects of CMM process maturity and to compare the nature of work under these conditions with work performed under somewhat less-disciplined processes. As of early 2000, Program A was at CMM Level 5; Program A's sister Program B was Level 3; Program C was almost Level 5 (it was certified Level 5 just a few months after my study): and Program C's sister program D was at Level 3.
In late 1999, I interviewed between 15 and 22 people at various hierarchical levels and in various functions in each of these four programs. (The interviewees' job titles are listed in Appendix 1.) Interviews lasted approximately one hour. They were tape-recorded and interviewees were assured anonymity. The recordings were transcribed, and edited versions were sent back to interviewees for review and correction. I also consulted voluminous internal documentation from each of these programs as well as documents from corporate entities supporting them.
My reliance on interviews rather than ethnographic techniques warrants discussion. As Nardi (1996: 81-81) points out, intentionality and shared, explicit understandings play a key role in the life of an activity system. Conditional on the researcher allowing diverse voices to be heard, interviewees can act as informants rather than mere respondents, and interviews can give us access to the relevant intentions and understandings. This method would be far less useful, and ethnographic, suveys, or experimental techniques would be more appropriate, if our focus were not on "activities" but instead on "actions" or on "operations" (to use the distinction referred to above).
To bring some order to these materials, I moved back and forth between existing theories and concepts derived inductively from the interview data. A draft report was circulated to interviewees and other interested parties at GCC, and their comments and corrections were incorporated in subsequent iterations. The present article distills the key arguments. (The longer report, xxxx, is posted at xxxx. It includes more extensive interview material supporting the findings summarized here.)
The Capability Maturity Model
In the 1980s, the U.S. Air Force studied 17 major software systems contracts and found that every project was late (by an average of 75%) and over budget (Humphrey, forthcoming) . The chaos in large-scale commercial sector projects was (and still is) in general even worse (Jones, 2002) . Prompted by frustration with such chaos, in 1984 the Department of Defense (DoD) funded the Software Engineering Institute (SEI, based at Carnegie-Mellon University) to develop a model of a more reliable software development process. In 1987, SEI, with the assistance of the MITRE Corporation, began developing a process maturity framework, and in 1987 released a first description. A first official version was released in 1991. Successive versions of the software CMM were released in subsequent years. A broadening community of industry people were involved in directing the path of this evolution. Paulk (1995, p.11) writes: "Nearly 1000 external reviewers who were part of a 'CMM Correspondence Group' had the opportunity to comment on the various drafts leading to CMM version 1.1. A CMM Advisory Board helped the SEI review and reconcile conflicting requests." The software CMM was subsequently complemented by CMM tools for systems engineering, people management, software acquisition, and engineering. In 2000, several of these were integrated into a broader tool called CMM-Integration.
This study focuses the software CMM. This CMM distinguishes five successively more "mature" levels of process capability, each characterized by mastery of a number of Key Process Areas (KPAs) -see Exhibit 2. The CMM belongs to a class of improvement approaches that focus on "process" rather than "people." It does not recommend any particular approach to organizational and behavioral issues: it focuses on the "whats" and not the "hows," leaving CMM users to determine their own implementation approach. Level 1 represents an ad hoc approach. Level 2 represents the rationalization of the management of individual projects. Level 3 addresses the way the organization manages its portfolio of projects. Levels 4 and 5 address how the organization quantifies and improves its processes. The underlying philosophy of this hierarchy was inspired by Crosby's (1979) five stages of TQM maturity (uncertainty, awakening, enlightenment, wisdom, certainty) (see Humphrey, forthcoming; a bibliography on the CMM is available at http://www.sei.cmu.edu/docs/biblio.pdf).
[put Exhibit 2 about here] Early CMM assessments revealed a startlingly backward state of process in most software organizations: 80.3% of the 132 organizations assessed during 1987-1991 were found to be at the "ad hoc" Level 1, 12.1% at Level 2, with only 6.8% at Level 3, 1.4% at Level 4 and 0.8% at Level 5. Over the subsequent years, there appears to have been significant shift (although it is difficult to tell given the changing and unrepresentative nature of the sample). Of the 1124 organizations assessed between 1998 and August 2002, 19.3% were at Level 1, 43.2% at Level 2, 23.4% at Level 3, 7.3% at Level 4 and 6.8% at Level 5 (Software Engineering Institute, 2002) . This shift was assisted by the fact that the DoD and other government and private-sector organizations began using Software Capability Evaluations (SCEs) based on the CMM as part of their source selection process. The first evaluations pressed suppliers to reach Level 2, but before long the bar was raised to Level 3. Not surprising, the CMM has become the basis for numerous software service organizations' improvement efforts. (The CMM is much less frequently used among firms developing pre-packaged software products: see Software Engineering Institute, 2002, p.8.) Evidence has accumulated that moving up the CMM hierarchy leads to improvements in product cost, quality, and timeliness. The SEI website lists case several studies of high-maturity organizations and the benefits they have achieved. According to one multi-organization study (Clark, 1999) , total development costs decreased by 5 to 10% for every further level attained. Clark estimated that the effect of going from Level 1 to 5 is an overall reduction in effort of between 15% and 75% depending on the size of the project. Another study (Harter, Krishnan, Slaughter, 2000) examined 30 software projects in the systems integration division of a large IT firm over the period 1984-96, and estimated the effects of moving from Level 1 to 3 to be an increase of 578% in the lines of code per error, a reduction of 30% in cycle time, and a reduction of 17% in person-months of effort. (Other multi-organization studies include Krishnan, Kriebel, Kekre, Mukhopadhyay, 2000; Herbsleb, Zubrow, Goldenson, Hayes, Paulk, 1997.) Building process at GCC GCC is one of the largest software services firms in the world. Major players in this industry include Accenture, IBM, EDS, and CSC. In 2000, GCC's total sales exceeded $9 billion. It employed around 58,000 people. GCC had experienced double-digit annual revenue growth over most of the prior decade. (On the software industry and its components and major players, see Hoch et al, 2000, and Mowery, 1996) . Notwithstanding the growth of the personal computer market and the associated mass-market pre-packaged "software products" industry, the bulk of the rapidly expanding software industry resembles GCC and its competitors in delivering "software services" -creating fully or partly customized, large-scale systems for specific clients. (In 2000, according to data provided by IDC, software services accounted for revenues of $395B versus $171B for software products. Steinmuller (1996) notes that both these industry segments are small relative to the software developed for their own use by firms and public organizations.)
At GCC, as in other large organizations, the term "process" was used to refer to a whole hierarchy of increasingly fine-grained SOPs: 1. "Policies" defined universal requirements; 2. "Processes" defined the interfaces between organizational units; 3. "Procedures" defined activities within the project; and 4. "Instructions" defined requirements at the individual task level.
The "granularity" of process at its finest levels can be gauged by the Instructions at Program C. There were separate Instructions that covered high-level design, two types of low-level design, two types of code reviews, one for testing, as well as Instructions for filling out Change Request Implementation forms and Root Cause Analysis forms. Each Instruction was several pages in length. They might include the specific forms to be completed as well as flow-charts detailing the sequence of associated tasks. Overall, the written processes summed to some eight linear-feet of shelf space. A description of the Government Systems group's process documentation is given in Appendix 2. In recent years, almost all of this documentation had been put on-line, along with a host of other management information and communication tools. Prescribed work-flows were being built into automated documenting routing systems. Appendix 3 describes this technology infrastructure.
If the documentation that developers were required to read was voluminous, so too was the documentation that they were required to write. In the words of one interviewee (perhaps exaggerating for dramatic effect): "I can write the code in two hours, but then I have spend two days documenting it. It can be very frustrating. We have to document check-in and check-out, a detail design plan, a development plan. We have to print out all the differences between the old and the new code. There's documentation for inspection and certification. There's an internal software delivery form. A test plan. And all these need to be signed.
[…] I used to be an independent developer for about three years. I never even created a flowchart of my work! The only documentation I needed was a 'to do' list. So I had to change of lot of habits when I got here." (B-2)
To some extent, this formalization was due to size. The projects in the programs under study here were not huge (see details below), but were large enough to require a level of formalization and standardization that was noticeably higher than some employees had experienced in prior positions in smaller establishments. Moreover, government clients typically imposed more documentation requirements than commercial sector clients. And in Programs A and C, formalization was due to the life-threatening risks associated with the products that the software was supporting.
The four program s
For the main part, the analysis below will abstract from the differences between the four programs. But the programs differed in many ways, as did the departments within them. Some background is therefore useful.
Program A: CMM Level 5. Program A had had a continuous contractual relationship with its customer for 30 years. Many employees had been attracted to the program because of the high public profile of the customer. Historically, Program A had 10 to 20 projects under way at any one time, each building mid-sized subsystems composed of 100,000-400,000 lines of source-code. Recent years, however, had seen a downsizing of the organization due to the changes in the customer's needs. Between 1995 and 1999, employment had shrunk from over 1600 to around 450.
Program A relied mainly on established technology and was responsible for a considerable amount of software maintenance. Over time, however, the program's tasks had become more complex as the customer requirements and the associated technologies had evolved. The business environment had also become more demanding, with considerable pressure for more code reuse and tighter deadlines.
Program A adopted the CMM in the early 1990s, and during the latter part of the decade used both CMM and ISO-9001 to help guide their improvement efforts. While their customer did not require CMM certification, external pressure played an important role in its adoption:
"We knew that other clients would require it and we felt it might be a good thing to do to help us improve." (B-13, formerly with Program A)
In 1991 the first formal, external Software Capability Evaluation (SCE) rated the organization a Level 1. The organization subsequently undertook several internal self-assessments. In 1996, the second evaluation rated them close to Level 3. In 1998, they were formally assessed as a Level 5 organization.
Program A was the "poster child" for aggressive process improvement efforts at GCC. Analyzing some 30 projects over the 1994-2000 timeframe, Program A found that both productivity and quality improved on average by 10% per year. They also saw dramatic improvement in the accuracy and speed with they forecast costs and schedule for project proposals.
A survey of Program A personnel in 1999 asked whether they saw value in the effort associated with CMM certification. There were 260 responses from 850 surveys distributed. Opinions were largely positive, and more so among people who had personally participated in an audit. Of those not audited for the CMM, 58% saw CMM as "well worth the effort" and another 30% as "of some value." Of those audited, 79% thought CMM was "well worth the effort" and another 18% thought it was "of some value." The proportion who thought it was of little or no value was 12% among the non-audited and 3% among the audited.
Program B: CMM Level 3. Program B's mission was to build information management tools for its government client to use in operations around the world: internal accounting, management, IS resource management, and so on. Program B's staff developed new systems, maintained and upgraded old ones, and operated a Help Desk.
GCC won the contract in 1998 by promising to leverage GCC's experience in Program A to help Program B reach CMM Level 3 within 18 months. GCC replaced nearly 30 contractor organizations who had worked largely independently of each other. Program B functioned as a prime contractor and system integrator, both developing systems themselves and coordinating a small number of subcontractors.
Program B itself employed directly or indirectly about 275 people. The largest of its projects employed about 90 people of which about two-thirds were subcontractors. The system was composed of 700 files, comprising about 1 million lines of source-code (MSLOC).
To help reach Level 3, several people were transferred from Program A. The two largest projects were each led by former Program A people, and Program A veterans staffed several other key management and staff positions. Program B's process effort were slowed down by a very difficult Y2K project, which strained relations with the client. Once that project was completed, relations improved. The program was officially assessed as Level 3 in early 2000.
Program C: CMM Level 5. This program, like Program A, had had a continuous contractual relationship with its DoD end-customer for some 30 years. But the relationship had always been mediated by other organizations serving as prime contractors. Program C undertook two or three major projects at time, each representing about 2.5 MSLOC. These projects created new versions of the weapons system control software they provided to the DoD. Program C employed about 450 people. It was divided into four main units that developed and maintained the main modules of the system, plus several support departments.
In recent years, there had been a swing towards greater bottom-up participation and a corresponding effort to change management styles.
"I think it's fair to say that our culture has not put a lot of weight on things like participation and empowerment. When I first came on board, I found levels of secrecy, need to know, and cones of silence. In part, that was due to the influence of customer we worked with, and to the high proportion of senior people both there and here with military backgrounds. It was like, 'Don't ask questions; just do it,' and the ethos around here was more like 'Just do your job.' Even the TQM program in the early 1990s didn't make much of an impact. It was seen mainly as a passing fad. But in the last 18 months, the change has been dramatic. We've started to free up resources for symbolic and financial recognition. And we've emphasized communication more." (C-14)
The key drivers of process maturity at Program C had historically been the succession of Military Standards imposed by the end-customer (the government) in conjunction with the intermittent pressure of their immediate customer (the prime contractor) (see Schulmeyer 1998 for an overview of the evolution of the Department of Defense standards). Unlike Programs A and B, Programs C and D did not have dedicated Process Engineering groups driving process improvement, but relied instead on an expanded Quality Assurance staffs and cross-functional management-level Software Engineering Process Groups (SEPGs). Nevertheless, by the middle of 1998, Program C was evaluated at Level 4, with all but some minor elements of Level 5 in place as well. In 2001, it was evaluated at Level 5. The quality of its products was widely recognized. The program had averaged 97% of award fees, which is an unusually high rate among DoD contractors.
Program D: CMM Level 3. Program D began operations in 1991, developing infrastructure systems for the DoD. Program D was unusual within GCC because it covered the whole product lifecycle, offering complete solutions including hardware, the integration of hardware and software, warehousing, installation, and on-going support. It had developed 2 MSLOC over the 1993-1999 period. Program D was also unusual within GCC for its extensive use of commercial, off-theshelf (COTS) hardware and software. Its systems incorporated over 200 commercial products. The program's systems were being used in about 100 sites, of which about 50 were inter-linked. In 2000, Program D employed some 350 people directly, plus a further 120 contractors.
Until recently, software process had received less attention in this program than in the others studied. According to one interviewee: "The Program D system was billed as based on a prototyping approach rather than the traditional waterfall approach. At the time, this was pretty leading-edge stuff at GCC, and it attracted people who don't like the discipline associated with relatively routine projects of the kind GCC Government Systems projects had traditionally done. But the initial team of 30 people has grown to nearly 600, and the business really has to deliver, so they realized they needed at least some Level 2 discipline. Even some of the die-hards have had a kind of religious conversion, and have become quite committed to process now." (D-14) Process had recently moved into the foreground. As part of a bid for very large DoD contract, Program D had to undergo an external process evaluation. In preparation for that evaluation, they conducted their own assessment, and discovered that the program would likely be rated no higher than a Level 1. As a result, the general manager chartered an Improvement Team and charged it with taking the program to Level 3. QA was significantly strengthened -the staff grew from three to eight people -and a broad effort at process documentation was undertaken throughout the organization by department-level Action Teams. By the end of the 1999, the program was assessed as Level 3.
Differences across the programs. Organization theory (Lawrence and Lorsch, //; Galbraith,//) teaches us that the scope for process standardization and formalization such as recommended by the CMM is closely related to the degree of routineness versus uncertainty of the organization's key tasks. Task routineness varied across these GCC programs -that is, people encountered more or fewer exceptions to established patterns of problem-solving, and these exceptions were more or less difficult to resolve. And as predicted, the level of detail in the process varied across programs with this routineness. For example, in comparison with Program C, its sister program D dealt with a broader range of technologies and these technologies evolved more rapidly. Not surprisingly, Program C was considerably more mature in its process than Program D and its process was more controlled at finer degrees of granularity.
Within programs too, the tasks of different departments differed in their degree of uncertainty and degree of process discipline. For example, at Program D, one department was responsible for defining site requirements, planning and procuring hardware, getting it to the site, and installing it, and this department, unlike Development, did specify Instructions. One interviewee from the Development function in Program D put it thus:
"We've pretty much stopped at the Procedures level, and haven't gone to the next level of detail, Instructions. There may be some use in creating a more detailed level of process in a few places. But in Development, I think we've gone as far as we want to go, and if we tried to go any further, the process would become too constraining or too expensive. Some processes probably could be driven to a finer level of granularity, but given the volatility of requirements, it would be ridiculously expensive. Sometimes we change direction weekly, but we still have to maintain schedule. I suppose we're somewhere between a symphony orchestra and a jazz band. We need a score, but we also need to be able to improvise a fair bit. Now, only about 25% of my work is based on exception. The rest follows a process. If we tried to define the process in more detail, that ratio would go way up." (D-11) Notwithstanding these differences, all the departments in all four programs had come under pressure to adopt a more mature process orientation. Partly this was due to external institutional pressure to conform the expectations of key customers. But partly it was because progress towards higher CMM Levels appeared to at least some insiders as a valuable opportunity for technical process improvement:
"[E]ven when tasks are more innovative, you can still get a lot of advantage from process. You need to sit down and list the features you want in the system, and then work out which are similar and which are different from your previous work. And you need to make sure the differences are real ones. You'll discover that even in very innovative projects, most of the tasks are ones you've done many times before. Then, for the tasks that are truly novel, you can still leverage your prior experience by identifying somewhat related tasks and defining appropriate guidelines based on those similarities. They won't be precise instructions of the kind you'll have for the truly repetitive work: but these guidelines can be a very useful way to bring your experience to bear on the creative parts of the work." (B-9, formerly with Program A).
A common Human Resource Management challenge. Software development relies primarily on relatively "professional" personnel. It is true that software developers' claim to professionalism is limited because they have not established an accreditation monopoly such as accorded physicians and lawyers, and because their knowledge base is not as theoretical (although a discipline of "software engineering" has begun to change this) (see Abbott, //). Nevertheless, two factors encouraged a professional status and outlook. First, software development depends critically on the capabilities of the staff, and these capabilities are more occupation-specific and less firmspecific than is the case with less-professionalized occupations. In the four focal units, two-thirds of the personnel held a Bachelors, Masters, or PhD degree. And second, notwithstanding the rigors of process maturity, developers needed to exercise considerable discretion in their work to ensure quality and efficiency.
Given this relatively professional character and given too the persistent imbalance of supply and demand in the labor market for software personnel, staff retention had long been a high priority for GCC and an important consideration in the management of process rationalization efforts. As government contractors, salary levels were largely outside management's control, and tended to be lower than in the commercial sector. By policy, GCC offered only modest financial incentives to staff below senior management; symbolic rewards were more common. So managers understood that retaining talented employees depended above all on making GCC a good place to work, with both good employment conditions and work that was challenging. Overall, annual staff turnover in recent years was in the 15-20% range in the programs studied, as compared to an industry average often estimated at 20-25%.
KEY FINDINGS
Overall, my interviews suggest that the standardization and formalization represented by CMM-style process maturity had broadly positive effects, both technical and attitudinal. Technically, the more routine tasks in software development were rendered more efficient by standardization and formalization, leaving the non-routine tasks relatively unstructured to allow more creativity in their performance. Moreover, non-routine tasks benefited from the guidance afforded by modest, welldesigned efforts at standardization and formalization, and from the elimination in noise created by unnecessary rework in routine tasks.
Attitudinally, in its effects on developers' experience of work, process maturity was experienced by many developers as enabling and empowering rather than coercive and alienating. Process maturity did mean a loss of autonomy. Higher CMM Levels drew people into broader and tighter webs of interdependence, both horizontally and vertically. The individualistic "hacker" model of software development was progressively displaced by a new understanding of work as a collective endeavor. In that collective endeavor, process discipline, even though a constraint on individual autonomy and a burden on individual productivity, was usually seen as a functional necessity in the pursuit of individually-and collectively-valued goals relative to cost, quality, and schedule, and relative to the improvement over time in all three of these dimensions.
The key to ensuring a positive response to process discipline was extensive participation: As several interviews summarized it: "People support what they help create." These organizations had both formalized processes supporting participation and strong normative commitments to participative rather than autocratic styles of leadership. The resulting organizational form resembled what Adler and Borys (//) termed an "enabling bureaucracy," combining a dense web of rules and a finely differentiated vertical and horizontal division of labor with high levels of trust and community cohesion.
Exhibit 3 uses the CHAT frameork to summarize the findings that are presented in more detail in the following paragraphs. The key process at work in the transformation of software development was one I call "socialization." Socialization is usually construed as the process whereby people new to a culture internalize its norms. Following Marx's (1973: 705) discussion of the socialization of the forces of production (and distinct from his discussion of the need to socialize the relations of production by nationalizing industry), I see such internalization as a special case of a more general phenomenon: the objective elements of an activity system can also be socialized insofar as they come to embody the capabilities developed in the broader context rather than only those capabilities that emerge from the local context (see also van der Pijl, 1998 , Sohn-Rethel, 1976 Kenney and Florida, 1993:304; Engels, 1978) . In this sense, process maturity socialized the objective elements of the software development activity system. In turn, the secondary contradictions between these changes in the objective nodes and the traditional, independent, "hacker" self-construal led to a shift at the subject node towards more interdependent self-construal, and in this sense, a more directly socialized self.
[put Exhibit 3 about here]
Object: An expanded object
By "object" I mean, as the dictionary and activity theory tell us, both (a) something given to the mind or senses and (b) a purpose. The object of a blacksmith's activity is simultaneously a piece of iron as an inert mass and a mental image of the shape it should take. Indeed, it is the tension between the two that motivates and guides the activity. When a collectivity takes software as its object, the nature of that object provides the primary motivation for the way work is conducted. Object is therefore a good place to begin.
My interviews suggest, first, that process maturity made the object of developers' work more stable and more intelligible. This object was less likely to mutate in unpredictable ways due to the poor quality of configuration control, requirements planning, or quality management:
"Before I came to GCC, I worked for very small software firm doing business software. It was what the SEI folks would call a Level 1 organization -completely ad hoc. No documentation, no design reviews, no standardized testing. So there was a lot of chaos and rework. [...] In a place like this, everything is more organized, and you know exactly where you are in the development process. I like the fact that you know where you're up to and how to do your work. It's more streamlined and there's less rework." (C-9) Second, process meant more paperwork. Process forced developers to document their work more thoroughly -to attach to the code or the test a description of its meaning, its intent, and the rationale of the design. The developer quoted immediately above went on to say: "On the other hand, I don't like all the paperwork. Your work may be more streamlined, but after the work is done, there's more forms you have to fill out to document what you've done." (C-9)
The deeper significance of the growing documentation burden seems to be that process maturity expanded the object of work. The rationale behind the increased documentation was to expand the object of one's work to include an imaginary dialogue with previous and future developers (a temporal expansion) and with other people who are working on the code (a social expansion): "I think that our process -and even the paperwork part of it -is basically a good thing. My documentation is going to help the next person working on this code, either for testing or maintenance. And vice versa when I'm on the receiving end." (C-11) Process also enabled a technical expansion of the object of work to include process itself. Developers were called upon to participate in process improvement efforts. The process itself thus became an object of their work:
"Perhaps the biggest change as we've become more process mature is that it makes everyone more interested in process improvement. Take an example: now I'm working on a new software utility. Top management asked us to evaluate it, to see if we should all use it. So I've been facilitating a series of meetings with all the managers, where everyone is talking about the utilities they are using and the problems they're having. It's been great to see this kind of problem-solving work going on. That's the effect of having a defined technology change management process. CMM got this process going for us." (D-12) Tensions: "In the end, it's all about profit and meeting schedules!" Process maturity meant tensions between competing priorities, between short-and long-term goals, and between technical and business needs: * "Lower-level managers juggle the needs of the customer and the pressures from GCC upper management. And upper management is focused primarily on things that strengthen GCC's position for obtaining future work rather than what we need to retain current work. So even though the requests for things like CMM ratings may have no value-added for our immediate assignment, we do them anyway." (A-12) * "I understand why we need the CMM evaluations. But it's added a lot to the amount of documentation we need and the number of interviews we have to go through. I suppose that in the long term, this documentation might help us improve, but for the developers, it's added a lot of paperwork." (C-9) Clearly, part of the CMM effort was "for show," responding to symbolic legitimacy pressures rather than technical performance pressures. As such, it sometimes led to a disconnect between formal process and daily practice (as described by Meyer and Rowan, 1977) : * "We do have written processes, but some are not always used consistently. They are not always being used by the developers. They are not always used by the program managers in their regular reviews." (B-13) * "The evaluation and CMM SCE forced us to update our documents. We didn't really change anything in how we work though." (D-10) In part, this tension reflected a deeper contradiction between use-value and exchangevalue. Interviewees were often aware that their (use-value oriented) process improvement efforts were at risk of being overridden by a higher (exchange-value) imperative: * "As I see it, GCC is a corporation, and that means it's run for the benefit of the major stockholders. So top management is incentivized to maximize dollar profits. Quality is only a means to that end, and in practice, quality sometimes gets compromised. I used to be a technical person, so I know about quality. But now I'm a manager, and I'm under pressure to get the product out -come what may. I just don't have time to worry about the quality of the product. I have a manager of software development under me who's supposed to worry about that." (D-20) * "It's hard to convince people that improving the process will help us get or keep business. We had a world-class process, and look what happened to us! [Recall the downsizing of Program A.] Jobs in an organization like this depend a lot more on the vagaries of contracting than on our process excellence." (A-6) The contradiction between use-value and exchange-value was particularly visible to the interviewees in the form of missed opportunities for process improvement:
"We could do better at capturing and using lessons learned. We have all the vehicles for doing itpresentations, newsletters, databases. But it takes time. And there are so many competing priorities. In the end, it's all about profit and meeting schedules!" (laughs) (A-8) Outcome: Collaborating with customers
The outcome of the software development activity system at these GCC programs was a market-mediated exchange, exchanging software for fees with a distinct activity system in the customer organization. This exchange was sometimes complicated when the GCC program was a subcontractor to a prime contractor who stood between the GCC program and the ultimate customer. Process was both influenced by and in turn influenced these relations.
As noted above, government agencies were increasingly making CMM Level 3 an important factor in awarding contracts. Program B's contract included an explicit Level 3 requirement, and customer pressure had been a critical impetus to process efforts in Programs A, C, and D too. For customers and suppliers alike, process maturity held the promise that the risks associated with arm's length market transactions -the inevitable gap between the producer's supply and the customer's demand -could be moderated by mutual commitment to a process that set expectations and guided collaborative decision-making:
"If I compare Program C with others that I've seen, the importance of customer maturity is obvious. With a low maturity customer, we'll see a high volume of change that's not managed well. Changes in direction and priority are the norm. The daily flux will be so great, and the demands so extreme, that it's very difficult for us to package changes so that releases of the product can be controlled and tested. Our internal controls work effectively when we're given time, but when time or priorities are changed by the client (who is always right -by definition), it creates a very challenging environment." (C-14) Tensions: coordination versus market anarchy. The fact that the customers were economically independent entities pursuing their own priorities often undercut the cooperation needed to assure a high-quality custom software process: "The biggest problem here is the customer and getting their buy-in. At Program A, our customer grew towards process maturity with us. Here [at B], we have a less mature client. Some of the customer managers have even told us that they don't want to hear about QA or our quality management systemthey see it as wasteful overhead. When you bid a project, you specify a budget for QA and so forth, but if they don't want to pay, you have a resource problem. And once you get the contract, then you start dealing with specific project managers within the customer organization, and some of these managers don't believe in QA or simply don't want to pay for it out of their part of the budget. On the Y2K project, the customer kept changing standards and deadlines. Basically, we are dealing with a pretty process-immature customer." (B-13, formerly with Program A)
Even at high levels of maturity, the outcome node was the site of a tertiary contradiction between two distinct activity sytems, GCC's and the customer's:
"Our customer has been rated a CMM Level 4, but they don't seem to implement their process. For example, in one of our recent projects, the requirements kept changing and the scope kept growing, but the customer wasn't following a disciplined process for controlling these changes and just didn't want to hear about the implications. The requirements kept drifting so much that it was very hard to even regularly update our estimate of the size of the project. They just ignored our concerns for nearly a year. Finally we issued a cost report that showed that that we'd need 25% more staff-months. Putting it in dollars finally got their attention. But not before we had wasted a lot of work and time." (C-5) Tools: "Help me do my work"
Under a more mature process, most interviewees felt that they had better tools for software development work. First, as we saw earlier, process was a tool that helped clarify the object of development work: "Our policies and procedures mean that I have better information on what we're trying to do because we have better requirements documents and better information on how to do it with Instructions etc. At Level 5 versus Level 1, I'm more confident we're all playing to the same sheet of music. Looking across the organization, process also means that managers understand better the way the whole system works, so they are all playing the same game." (C-2) Second, process functioned as a tool providing guidance in the work process: "Developers want above all to deliver a great product, and the process helps us do that. What I've learned coming here is the value of a well thought-out process, rigorously implemented, and continuously improved. It will really improve the quality of the product. In this business, you've got to be exact, and the process ensures that we are. You have to get out of hacker mode!" (A-14)
Overall, process did not appear to hinder creativity -or at least not the forms of creativity needed in these programs. Some quotations illustrate the interviewees' assessments: * "I don't see any real conflict between process and creativity. Process assures you that the system will work and gives you the ability to fix it if it doesn't. That's what I like about process." (D-17) * "Does Level 5 stifle innovation? Precisely the opposite! Pick a process that makes sense to you, then continually improve it through extensive participation. Why would that inhibit innovation?" (B-13, formerly with Program A) * "A more mature process doesn't have to limit creativity. For example, it doesn't limit our ability to bring in automated tools or new languages. And it's open to improvement, so it's pretty flexible." (B-8, formerly with Program A) Tools, however, need to fit the task. As discussed by contingency theory, the key factor was task uncertainty. Recall the assessment quoted earlier: "I suppose we're somewhere between a symphony orchestra and a jazz band. We need a score, but we also need to be able to improvise a fair bit." (D-11) Tensions: Less "people-dependence" means less (individual) power. Sophisticated tools such as offered by mature processes reduce the dependence of the organization on the individual: * "When I arrived here, we had a lot of veterans with deep process knowledge. But as we lost those people, we lost their institutional knowledge. That's why I'm trying to document our process. That will make us less people-dependent." (D-17) * "Our process makes us less people-dependent. And that goes for managers too. We have promoted the three project managers we used to have, and now we have five new project managers. Bringing these new managers up to speed was much easier with a strong process." (C-3)
While the direct business benefits were obvious, reducing people-dependence also reduced the individual's power vis-à-vis the organization. A fear of vulnerability thus lurked in the background:
"Programmers like to program. They never like to document. They say: 'Why can't I just write the code and if anyone has a problem, let them come and ask me?!' But without process, you're dependent on the people, and people do leave. If you have a good process, then people become like widgets you can stick into it, and everyone knows what their job is. Obviously that's a big advantage for the organization. [...] But there's some benefit for the individual programmer too: even if I personally don't like documentation, it makes other people that I depend on more reliable. And if you have staff turnover, the ones who stay on see the value of a less people-dependent process. On the other hand, it also brings some fear for job security. It does make my job as a programmer easier to fill." (B-15) This vulnerability was moderated by the favorable labor-market situation of software professionals. Moreover, our discussion of the division of labor will reveal that process gives more control both to subordinates and to managers.
Tensions: Further automation and simplification could reduce the burden. Automation was a crucial precondition for process maturity, since developers needed to consult voluminous documentation and circulate work-in-process in a timely manner. GCC had therefore invested considerable resources into building not only a sophisticated "development environment" for technical tasks but also an integrated suite of databases and tools for management tasks. The software factory was thus highly automated -contrasting with the handicraft or manufacturing models that prevailed in software development in earlier decades. Alongside this automation, GCC also sought to streamline the remaining human tasks: "Over the last ten years, we've refined the test procedures considerably. First, we have better tools. Documentation and reports that used to take two or three days each week to create can now be generated in an hour. Second, we streamlined some of the procedures for some projects. Now we have a generic template, which we can modify to suit the circumstances. We moved from prescribed, detailed test tables to simpler and voluntary guidelines based on historical examples. And with the benefit of experience and analysis, we are collecting more useful information and less of the kinds of information that proved to be not all that useful." (A-9) However, many interviewees argued that insufficient effort had been devoted to lightening the burdens of process. Comments such as these were common:
* "All these forms have a valid purpose, but it takes so long to fill them out that it just doesn't seem very efficient. We really need a lot more automation in doing all this." (B-6) * "There's no doubt that more process maturity means more paperwork. Some of it is good, and some of it is an impediment, especially from a productivity point of view. Unless we have the tools to automate this documentation, it has to slow us down. We still don't have the right tools." (C-5) These comments suggest that the activity systems still suffered from unresolved (secondary) contradictions between the available tools and the expanded object of work. The object had expanded in the eyes of managers and developers, but management had not freed up the resources needed to upgrade the tools to accomplish the new, expanded task. A more advanced model: The CMM as scaffolding In all four programs, but more so in the more advanced ones, the CMM was seen by many as representing a more advanced model of software development work -one that could guide improvement efforts. In this, the CMM took the form of a "scaffolding" that supported and guided efforts to improve the development process. The metaphor of scaffolding, originally articulated by Wood, Bruner and Ross (1976) , refers to the temporary assistance provided by teachers/adults to students/children as they strive to accomplish a task in their "zone of proximal development" (Vygostky, 1962 (Vygostky, , 1978 Griffin and Cole, 1984) .
The challenge of CMM certification was to "map" the program's existing practices to the CMM's KPAs. In some cases, existing practices were revealed to be satisfactory, and this mapping was therefore experienced as wasteful burden; but in most cases, the CMM provided guidance -the kind of guidance that builders receive from scaffolding -in standardizing and formalizing processes. Program C had long worked under Military Standards, so the CMM was experienced against that backdrop, but its experience was otherwise representative:
"Most of our CMM work has been focused on translating what we already do into the CMM KPAs. We were doing virtually all the KPAs anyway, just because you can't manage large-scale projects without doing something like what the SEI is recommending. The first SCE team told us they knew that we must have good procedures and that everyone followed them because everyone told us the same thing; but, they said, the process must have been tattooed on the inside of eyelids because they couldn't find them written down anywhere. So we spent the next year putting them down on paper. For example, we had an informal training and mentoring program, and when we got serious about the CMM, we wrote it down. Writing the process down has had some great benefits. It's made us think about how we work, and that's led to improvements. For example, formalizing the training program has helped bring some outliers into conformance. And we formalized the SEPG process, and that has helped stimulate improvement." (C-15)
The CMM could function effectively as scaffolding -as a model of a more advanced activity system -because, and to the extent that, it was seen as an "industry-validated approach": "The CMM is helping us move ahead. Just to take an example, even if the CMM didn't exist we would need a technology change management process [a Level 5 KPA]. Of our 450 people, we have about 50 people in CM, QA, and data management. To move them from one process to another is sometimes like herding cats! The CMM helps us in that by providing an industry-validated approach." (C-10)
In their struggle against proponents of alternative organizational development scenarios, proponents of the CMM had the advantage of this cultural-historical validation. In offering software development organizations a prescription for their future that was based on lessons drawn from the industry's past, the CMM functioned in precisely the "proleptic" manner described by Cole (1976: 183 ff.) .
Tensions: Scaffolding versus learner-centered development. Notwithstanding the research evidence cited earlier, interviewees were nuanced in their assessments of the impact of CMM on process effectiveness. One common concern was that the CMM prescribed certain features of the development process and in doing so, substituted its own "wisdom" for the results that might emerge from a more self-directed learning process. This concern echoed critiques of the "top-down" nature of the scaffolding metaphor (Stone, 1993; Butler, 1998) .
As discussed above, part of the difficulty was how to juggle the goals of symbolically valuable certification with technically valuable process improvement. At its best, external legitimacy pressure could facilitate internal change. However, CMM ratings seemed to play a somewhat different role in the different organizations. According to one interviewee: "I can see that external evaluations are a very important learning tool. It's just like in college: 90% of what the student learns is in the week before the test! So we do need the test to create that incentive. But it's not an end in itself. So the real issue is: Is passing the test just a veneer? That depends on how the managers treat the test --as an opportunity to put some banners on the walls, or as an opportunity to focus attention and get some real learning done. At Program A, we have reached (well, almost reached) the point where people like the tests as an opportunity to show off their improvements." (B-13, formerly with Program A) Tensions: Is CMM really a more advanced model? Some interviewees in Programs A and C expressed skepticism concerning the value of Level 4 and 5 practices. Levels 4 and 5 address organization-wide, as distinct from project-specific, capabilities. Optimistically, one might imagine that once a basic level of discipline was established in the conduct of individual projects, even greater improvement might come from organization-wide cross-project discipline, since this would enable an organization to leverage lessons learned from any one project to the whole portfolio of projects. This would seem to be true of many hardware development improvement efforts (see Wheelwright and Clark, //; Smith and Reinertsen, 1991) . So far, however, the experience of the two Level 5 programs was mixed.
At Programs A and C, several interviewees assessed the overall situation in these terms:
* "We struggled to get past Level 3. Level 3 seems to give you most of the CMM's benefits. Frankly, Levels 4 and 5 haven't changed or helped much. Beyond 3, documenting the technology management process didn't really do much for us: we manage to change technology pretty effectively without formalizing that process. But on the other hand, defect prevention has been very useful." (A-2) * "I think Level 3 was worth doing. But most of Levels 4 and 5 just don't seem to add much. It isn't about everyday stuff anymore. We are doing most of these processes, and documenting them adds a lot of cost but not much value." (C-4)
Interviews suggested three possible reasons for this lack of enthusiasm for Levels 4 and 5. First, the CMM might have been simply misguided in how it characterized Levels 4 and 5. After all, when the CMM was first elaborated, these levels, particularly Level 5, were essentially hypothetical, since so few software organizations had been shown to function in this manner. Second, and alternatively, perhaps Levels 4 and 5 were well-conceived, but the hypothesized potential benefits would only materialize with further effort. A third possible reason is that the magnitude of the benefits of cross-project processes is related to the number of projects undertaken. Both Program A and Program C undertook a relatively small number of relatively large projects -as compared to the larger number and smaller size of projects we might find in the hardware development organizations studied by Wheelwright and Clark, and by Smith and Reinertsen. Rules: Constraints that make sense (mainly)
In its role as (a set of) rules, process mediates the relationship between the individual and the community. On this score, the interviews revealed that process maturity did mean more constraints on how developers did their work, but also that these constraints were largely seen as means by which the efforts of many contributors to the development activity could be coordinated more effectively:
"In a small organization doing small projects, you have a lot of flexibility, but there's not much sharing. You're kind of on your own. Here, I'm just a small part of a bigger project team. So you don't do anything on your own. It's a collaborative effort. So there has to be a lot of communication between us. And the process is there to ensure that this communication takes place and to structure it. The process helps keep us all in sync." (C-13) At higher levels of process maturity, developers had more opportunity to participate in defining and refining the rules. As quoted above, interviewees described the cultures of Programs A and C as having become more participative in recent years. In daily practice, rules took the "enabling" form described by Adler (asq, ame//). Through a formalized "Tailoring Cycle," software development standards and procedures ("S&Ps," of which there were over 100 at Program A) were modified for each project with participation by the developers themselves:
* "People have to be a part of defining the process. We always say that 'People support what they help create.' That's why the Tailoring Cycle is so important. As a project manager, you're too far away from the technical work to define the S&Ps yourself, so you have to involve the experts. You don't need everyone involved, but you do need your key people. It's only by involving them that you can be confident you have good S&Ps that have credibility in the eyes of their peers." (A-8) * "When S&Ps are chosen for a project, the rule is that they have to be sent out to everyone affected for review. And sometimes we give some pretty negative feedback! I remember I wrote on one draft, 'Hey, you've forgotten to tell us how to get out of bed in the morning and how to brush our teeth!' It was way too detailed and rigid. Those kinds of things get shot down pretty quickly. Over a period of years, people learned how to write procedures that were reasonable for our work environment. [...] When I managed software development on one of our bigger projects, I asked all our software developers to help me tailor our S&Ps. The GCC people knew the drill, but we also had some other contractors working on this with us [...] and they would say, 'No, just tell me how you want us to do this.' About a year into the project, I remember one of the contractors who had complained the most about this extra work coming to me to thank me, saying, 'If you'd have written these, I would have just ignored them. But since I helped write them, I've felt duty bound to follow them.'" (A-12)
The Tailoring Cycle was not the only vehicle for participation in process definition: in Programs C and D, Software Engineering Process Groups (SEPGs) also served this purpose. In recent years, the SEPG at C, but less so at D, had put increasing weight on encouraging suggestions for process improvement from lower-level staff.
Finally, many departments in all four programs had process improvement teams. But whereas these were sporadic in the less mature programs, they were ubiquitous and on-going in the more mature programs.
Tensions: Rules, enabling versus coercive. Active participation was both a precondition and a symptom of the enabling, as distinct from coercive, function of rules (see also Ravichandran and Rai, 2000, and Ahire et al., 1996 , on the importance of participation to successful TQM implementation). But managers at GCC were not immune to the temptations of coercion:
"Buy-in is important in this kind of business. Take an example: programming languages. The DoD was very enthusiastic a few years ago about Ada. It was a great language from a management point of view, since it specified things in a way that gave management a lot of control over the process. But the programmers preferred C because it was less constraining and more open. They simply refused to get on board with Ada, and management lost the fight." (A-11)
The professional character of the workforce gave developers considerable power to resist coercive rules. Another excerpt offers a second illustration: "Whenever you force programmers to do paperwork they don't want to do, they get sloppy. They will invent workarounds just to avoid it. And those workarounds can create problems. For example, if you want to create a new sub-routine versus add to an existing one, you have to write a whole new package. So programmers will go a long way to avoid creating a new sub-routine, even if it means that the quality of the code is affected." (B-2)
The importance of buy-in and its difficult relation to hierarchical authority is evidenced in the firmness with which senior management treats instances of autocratic behavior by both staff and line managers: * "By and large, we haven't had too much difficulty bringing our managers around to this more collaborative approach. But we choose our project managers with an eye to their commitment to collaboration too. We did have a problem with one staff person. He had a very difficult relationship with the project people he was supposed to be helping. We got a lot of complaints that he was trying to force the projects to conform to his idea of how they should function. We tried to counsel him and get him to work in a more cooperative way. But he just wouldn't ease up. Eventually we just had to let him go." (A-11) * "We did have a pretty autocratic manager a while back in our software development organization. He had very strong technical skills and would often make decisions without consulting his staff. We heard a lot of complaints, and we saw some turnover too. But his technical skills made him very valuable to us, so we kept him on even after he offered to resign. We tried to get him to change his style, but he didn't, and eventually, after maybe two years of this, we just had to let him go. It was difficult. And he took a few loyal staff people with him too." (D-5) Community: Beyond my cube
The relationship of the individual to the object of work is mediated by community. The community node captures membership boundaries and identities, At higher levels of process maturity, the collective nature of software development work became more explicit as did the organizational architecture of this community. Individual autonomy was lost as the individual was drawn into a broader and tighter web of work relations. The boundaries of individual's everyday reference group -the community with which people identified -broadened to encompass all the functions that contributed to the final product: * "At Level 5, everyone feels part of the enterprise -versus feeling very good technically, in what they do, but hazy about their place in the whole business organization -for example, they can't explain the functions of QA. At Level 5, you understand what other people are doing and why." (B-13, formerly with Program A) * "Some programmers here used to be very isolated. We had one fellow who just sat in his cube all day from six in the morning till two in the afternoon. Many of us didn't even know his name! But the process here drew him into team meetings, and into new conversations. Eventually we even got him helping with training." (B-7) * "The Improvement Team's work created a real sense of community. Each week it would be someone else's turn to present their process. Since you knew it would be your turn soon, we all helped each other. And everybody got to see how the rest of the organization functioned. All the data was shared. I compare that to the way the organization functioned a few years ago. One of our big problems was poor communications across the organization and up and down the organization. No one knew anything anyone else was doing. Now we're working in unison. Process makes for a more unified front for the customer. And it makes you feel important, because you're part of the process and you know where you're at in the process. I'm only a tiny part of the process, but I know that what I do is needed for the success of the whole thing." (D-12) Tensions: Community versus self. Ultimately, the wage relation recognizes individuals, not collectivities. Even in firms with extensive team and organization-wide rewards, these are minor components of the individual rank-and-file employee's compensation. The "collective worker" (Marx, //) -the community as productive actor -is in contradiction with the individualistic and instrumental foundation of wage relation. The result was disinterest and passivity on the part of many: * "I think the Program D top management team works really well together. But further down in the organization, a lot of people are in the dark about what's going on. The managers and technical leads are variable in their abilities, particularly in their ability to get above their cube and see the bigger picture. There isn't enough teamwork lower down in the organization." (D-18) * "I follow the rules because they are there." (B-6) * "By and large, people just accept the Instructions pretty passively." (C-2) * "It's hard to scare up much process improvement effort from the troops. Almost all the process improvement activity comes from people assigned to that task." (C-15) Tensions: Community versus class. On the one hand, developers and managers were (and saw themselves) part of a community, part of the collective-worker. On the other hand, their interests sometimes put them in opposition to each other. We saw this in the pervious subsection's discussion of the conflict over Ada, and in the earlier discussion of the organization's interest in avoiding "people-dependence" versus the insecurity this creates for the people concerned. Not surprisingly, senior management put considerable weight on building a sense of common destiny and community. But the battle was could never be won once and for all. This excerpt illustrates: " We didn't initially have any questions on the employee survey about your boss. Frankly, people were worried that managers might retaliate. But now we do, and we find the data very useful in surfacing management problems. The earlier rounds of the survey did show some big communications problems in some groups. Counseling often helped, and in some cases, we moved people out to other positions." (A-11)
Division of labor: Differentiation and integration
The relationship of the community to the object of its activity is mediated by the division of labor. The division of labor node captures who does what and who gets what. At GCC, the division of labor differentiated various roles and sub-units whose complementary capabilities were integrated both by clear and salient superordinate goals and by strong process discipline. Interviewee B-7 presented an assessment that was particularly interesting because her experience of a relatively mature process was recent:
"A more mature process means you go from freedom to do things your own way to being critiqued. It means going from chaos to structure. It's a bit like streetball versus NBA basketball. Streetball is roughhousing, showing off. You play for yourself rather than the team, and you do it for the love of the game. In professional basketball, you're part of a team, and you practice a lot together, doing drills and playing practice games. You aren't doing it just for yourself or even just for your team: there are other people involved -managers, lawyers, agents, advertisers. It's a business, not just a game. You have to take responsibility for other people -your team-mates -and for mentoring other players coming up." (B-7)
Process maturity created both more differentiation and more systematic integration in three dimensions of the division of labor: horizontal, staff/line, and vertical. I take them in turn.
As process became more mature and disciplined, the horizontal division of labor deepens and the span of integration becomes broader: actors developed relations with a broader set of partners. These relations became tighter: the coordination across groups became more rigorous. And they became more collaborative: mutual indifference or rivalry was replaced by active collaboration. These changes were visible within departments and well as between them:
"Process means that people play more specialized, defined roles, but also that these specialists get involved earlier and longer as contributors to other people's tasks. If we analyzed the way a coder uses their time, and compared it with comparable data from, say, 15 years ago, we'd find the coder doing less coding because of more automated tools. They'd be spending more time documenting their code, both as it was being built and afterwards in users' guides. They'd be spending more time in peer reviews. And they'd be spending more time in design meetings and test plan meetings. As for testers […] now the testers are more involved in system concept definition and requirement definition activities." (A-3) This combination of greater differentiation and greater integration was visible in regards to both Process Engineering -a new staff function that emerged in Programs A and B to focus on process -and Quality Assurance -a staff whose function changed with growing process maturity. (For discussion of the impact of process maturity on the role of another key staff function, Configuration Management, see Butler, Standley, and Sullivan, 2001 : many of the same conclusions apply.) QA illustrates. In the past, QA was often remote from the daily work of developers, arriving on the scene at the end of the work cycle to inspect the output. However, its role evolved with process maturity to (a) a greater focus on process quality rather than only product quality, (b) greater responsibility for infusing process rather than only auditing it, and (c) a closer and more collaborative relation with the line departments. QA's role in the Tailoring Cycle is a good example of the nature of their relations with line groups: "First, QA sits down with project manager and his management team. I'll ask: what processes do you need? Do they exist? We come up with a process approach for the project. Second, project managers work with Process Engineering to resolve the action items out of the first step: what new S&Ps have to written? Which have to be modified? The project managers, often assisted by their leads, then define the S&Ps they need. Third, this proposal comes to the CRB [Change Review Board] for discussion and approval. Fourth, we try to get the managers of each project to do the training for their S&Ps. Fifth, QA conducts a regular in-progress process audit to check the project's compliance with the process approach they've chose. And there's also an End-of-life-cycle-phase audit.
[…] QA is not a policeman! QA is there to help the project identify the processes you need, tailor existing ones to your needs, learn that process, and do a check to see if you're using it. If I find a problem, it's my job to help the project work out how to address it and how I can help." (B-5) In the vertical dimension, too, relations grew denser and more collaborative. Process brought greater specificity -clarity and detail -to planning and assessing the progress of work:
"With a more mature process, my manager has visibility into how I do my work and can challenge me on it -I can't just play excuses and he can't use brute force." (B-6) Process also provided superior-subordinate relations with objectified points of reference outside the dyadic interpersonal relationship. Process thus reduced the "people-dependence" of these authority relations just as it reduced people-dependence in technical relations. Several interviewees argued that the objective character of the data created in a more mature process gave the subordinate more power: "I think formalized process and metrics can give autocratic managers a club. But it also gives subordinates training and understanding, so it makes the organization less dependent on that manager: he can be replaced more easily. Before I came to GCC, I worked for one of the most autocratic managers you can find. It was always, 'And I want that report on my desk by 5 p.m. today,' with no explanation or rationale. Compared to that kind of situation, an organization with a more mature process leaves a lot less room for a manager to arbitrarily dictate how you should work and when work is due. And a more mature process also means that there are more formal review points, so any arbitrary autocratic behavior by a manager will become visible pretty quickly." (D-5) Tensions: General versus parochial interests. Differentiation creates local identities, which complicates the horizontal integration task:
"On most of our projects, different people fill the two roles, systems engineering versus software engineering. (On smaller projects, the same person may have both roles.) As with any interaction between two groups, there have been communication gaps between them. There are a variety of reasons: the systems engineers point to the software engineers and say 'They didn't read what I wrote,' and 'They don't understand what I mean,' and the software engineers point back and say 'They didn't specify the requirements adequately,' 'The requirements are inconsistent,' and 'That wasn't in the requirements.' It gets even more challenging when the requirements changes keep coming up to the day before delivery." (D-14, who also works with Program C)
Interviewees also discussed tensions in the vertical dimension: management did not always "listen," or if they listened, did not always "hear." Whereas the horizontal tensions reflected intra-class conflicts and discoordination, the vertical ones reflected a deeper structural asymmetry of power and authority: "How managers react depends a bit on how you present your suggestion. If you present your idea constructively, they're more likely to react positively. If you come at them with complaints and negative criticism, they don't take it as well. Managers are people too! And sometimes how receptive they are depends on other things going on. For example, if they are under pressure from their bosses to move faster, they may not be very receptive to taking time out to redefine the process." (B-14) Notwithstanding these tensions, it was striking that in its horizontal, staff/line, and vertical dimensions, community appeared to be stronger and more cohesive at higher than at lower levels of process maturity. A key factor explaining this result was the variation in the extent of participation in process definition we saw in the discussion of rules. (Recall that rules mediate the relation of the subject to the community.)
Tensions: "We still don't have the resources." Several interviewees pointed to another persistent tension in the division of labor: the lack of dedicated resources for specialized staff departments. The following quotes were illustrative: * "We do ask project teams to do a Lessons Learned report at the end of the project. We post the results on the database. But there's no staff support for the process." (A-3) * "The key issue moving forward, I think, is that we still don't have the resources we need to devote to process. A program of this size should have a full-time staff dedicated to our internal process maintenance." (C-7) (Recall that Programs C and D did not have dedicated Process Engineering groups.) These concerns echo those relative to resources for better tools. Such tensions are inevitable when the object itself evidences the (primary) contradiction between use-value -great code, well produced -and exchange-value -"In the end, it's all about profit." Under such conditions, resource investment decisions are inevitably somewhat inconsistent. In the words of one interviewee: "One key challenge is maintaining buy-in at the top. Our top corporate management is under constant pressure from the stock market. The market is constantly looking at margins, but Government business has slim margins. That doesn't leave much room for expenditures associated with process improvementespecially when these take two or three years to show any payoff." (C-14) Subject: A mo e interdependent self r
My interviews suggest that process maturity led to a changed subjective identity among developers. The proximate cause of this change was the experience by developers of changes in the other, "objective" elements of the software production process. The objective elements now presented themselves to the individual subject as less local, tacit, and private, and as more universal, codified, and social -"socialized" in the sense introduced earlier. As a result, there emerged among developers a different understanding of themselves as subjects in the work process, a different "identity" -a more interdependent self-construal (Markus and Kitayama, //; see also Triandis et al., 1985, on allocentrism vs. idiocentrism) . What mattered to these professionals' self-esteem and identity was now not so much their individual efficacy as their collective efficacy (Bandura, 1997; Gibson and Earley, n.d.) . People differed, of course, and some resisted -resisting either this trend itself or particular forms of it that they experienced as oppressive. The following subsections offer some evidence for each of these points in turn.
A socialized production process. Traditionally, at the lowest levels of process maturity, Level 1, developers were at the heart of activity systems that emerged more or less autonomously, through informal interaction with peers. Greenbaum (1979: 64-4 ) quotes a programmer thus: "I remember that in the fifties and early sixties I was a 'jack of all trades.' As a programmer I got to deal with the whole process. I would think through a problem, talk to the clients, write my own code, and operate the machine. I loved it -particularly the chance to see something through from beginning to end." These activity systems were largely local. Kraft (1977: 56) writes of this period: "Programmers (and analysts) followed a logic and procedures which were largely of their own making," Being largely tacit rather than codified, tools and rules were difficult to communicate across locales. Working knowledge was in these senses private rather than social. As one of Greenbaum's interviewees put it:
"No one knew what was going on -certainly not the managers. But even the programmers and systems analysts were confused. There were no standards for doing anything -coding, testing, documentingthey were all done the way each person felt like it, or in fact, they were not done at all. [...] Programmers never documented what it was their program was to do. It was the same with setting up testing procedures and test data. When the whole system was put together, we never knew if it really worked because nothing got written down." (Greenbaum, 1979: 73-7) At higher levels of process maturity, in contrast, the developer was embedded in larger social aggregates, and encountered approaches that were the fruit of a complex, organized, large-scale process development effort -which appeared to the developer as such. Tools, more advanced models, rules, division of labor, community were no longer naturally emergent phenomena grounded in local experience. They were formalized and standardized. Developers were aware that their effectiveness was the not only the result of their own individual effort and skill and of informally shared tricks of the trade, but also and increasingly the result of this social, rather than private, accumulation of working knowledge (see Marx, 1973: 705) . Three interviews were particularly eloquent on this point: * "I came from a background in industrial process computers and the organization I worked for was much less structured in how they handled all this. The process was basically just define the requirements, write the code, then do a final test. Apart from that, you were basically on your own. Here the processes tell you a lot more about how to do the work. By formalizing things, they make it easier to incorporate lessons learned a lot a faster. Previously, it was more like a 'hand-me-down' -you learned how to do your work with some help from other people on the job, or just by yourself." (B-14) * "Where I used to work before I came to GCC, the development process was entirely up to me and my manager. What I did, when I did it, what it was going to look like when it was done, and so forth, was all up to me. It was very informal. Here everything is very different. It's much more rigid. It's much more formal. A lot of people lay out the schedule, the entire functionality, and what I'm going to be accountable for -before I even get involved. […] When I got here I was kind of shocked. Right off, it was 'Here are your Instructions.' 'So what does this tell me?' 'It tells you how to do your job.' I thought I was bringing the know-how I'd need to do my job. But sure enough, you open up the Instructions, and they tell you how to do your job: how to lay the code out, where on the form to write a change request number, and so on. I was shocked.
But I can see the need now. Now I'm just one of 30 or 40 other people who may need to work on this code, so we need a change request number that everyone can use to identify it. It certainly feels restrictive at first. They explained the Instructions and the whole Program C process to us in our orientation seminar, but it's hard to see the value of it until you've been around a while. Now I can see that it makes things much easier in the long run.
I hate to say it. As a developer, I'm pretty allergic to all this paperwork. It's so time-consuming. But it does help. You've got to keep in mind, too, that by the time we see the Instructions, they've been through a lot of revision and refinement. So they're pretty much on target." (C-13) * "I was not originally a believer in this process stuff. I remember seeing coding guidelines when I joined the Program D. I just threw them into a corner. But a year later, I found that my code didn't make it through the code checker, and that got me to reconsider. So I went to some CMM training a few years ago. And I've been converted! Most of the developers and leads are being dragged into process kicking and screaming. Any coder would rather just hack. And we have a lot of people who've never worked on a large project and have never gone through the nightmare of losing the source code." (D-22) Codification of knowledge: A key mechanism of socialization. A key force driving this socialization of the objective elements of production was the codification of working knowledgewriting it down. (On codification, see Industrial and Corporate Change, 2000; Adler,//). Codification led to socialization via five main effects: the creation of a common vocabulary, the development of objectified forms of collective memory, the depersonalization of conflicts, the facilitation of collective process improvement efforts, and the rationalization of professional skill formation.
First, a common vocabulary:
"In a Level 1 organization, one without a common process, even one where there was a lot of goodwill between the functions, they wouldn't have the common vocabulary, or common definitions of key tasks, and everything would be subject to conflicting interpretation, so people would be fumbling in the dark. A common process greatly simplifies things." (C-5) Second, memory became objectified and collective. In the earlier discussion of the object, we saw how documentation reflected an expansion of the object of work to include an imaginary dialogue with concurrent, previous, and future contributors to one's work. Documentation played this role because it afforded accessible memory: * "Process gives people access to assets from prior work -for estimation, for S&Ps, and for lessons learned. In our asset library, we keep the S&Ps of all our projects, and project managers refer back to these to use as templates. We encourage people to share and borrow." (A-3) * "Take for example our internal software delivery procedure. At first, developers thought that this was just more burdensome paperwork. But soon they found it was a great memory system." (B-5) Third, conflict became less personal, more public. Codified process meant that the parochial concerns of subgroups and individuals and the resulting conflicts were drawn into the open. These concerns became the objects of collective scrutiny and thus less covert:
"We say it's important to document software errors, but that's hard to sell! Developers are used to just doing the corrections, and the testers hate the documentation too. But we try to sell the testers on this by explaining that this way they can get credit for the problems they find. And we try to explain to them that if we document the errors, we can track them, and if errors recur, we can find root causes. That will help us convince the developers for example, that a given module has too many problems. When it's documented, it's less personal, and it helps the dialogue with the developers. But you also have to ensure that managers won't use the data punitively." (B-8) Fourth, improvement became a collective endeavor. With process codification, a broader range of people were drawn into a discussion of how their work should be performed. Instead of idiosyncratic work practices that reflected and reinforced individual autonomy, process created standardized templates that reflected and reinforced the collective character of software development:
"The Improvement Team's work created a real sense of community. Each week it would be someone else's turn to present their process. Since you knew it would be your turn soon, we all helped each other. And everybody got to see how the rest of the organization functioned." (D-12) Moreover, the collectivity involved here was not just that of the local program, but the broader Government Systems group, GCC as a corporation, and indeed, the global software process community who helped create and validate the CMM as an "industry-validated" approach.
Fifth, the acquisition of professional knowledge was rationalized. Process encouraged a shift from a traditional form of training -apprenticeship -towards something more systematic. Apprenticeship is a mode of learning that is appropriate and necessary when knowledge is the local, tacit, private property of the artisan-craftsman (see for example Sacks, 1994) . A more socialized production process relies on forms of knowledge that are more codified and on forms of training that are more rationalized:
"We've developed a formal mentoring program. There's a checklist of the key processes everyone needs understand, and every new person is assigned a mentor whose job it is to explain each of these in turn. The checklist is audited by QA." (A-9) Although codification plays a key role in socializing the production process, this codification did not eliminate the importance of tacit knowledge. Both old and new forms of tacit knowledge were critical to the effectiveness of documented knowledge (Adler, 1996; Dosi, 1996) . Documentation was largely complementary to tacit knowledge. This was visible in the challenge confronted by Program B in its efforts to learn from Program A's relative process maturity:
"We've brought in all the formal elements of the process -the policies, methodologies, standards and procedures, and handbooks on the process side, and structural elements like QA, Process Engineering, etc. But it's basically an empty shell as yet. Apart from the ex-Program A people, there's no depth to it, with little buy-in and little deployment." (B-12, formerly with Program A)
The interdependent self. Embedded within this socialized production process, the subject -the subjective identity of the individual actors, their self-construals -becomes more interdependent, more "socialized." In my interviews, "we" tended to replace "I" as the subject of work, because people increasingly saw themselves as part of a collective effort. In this regard, it is interesting that the ratio of mentions of "we" to mentions of "I" in my interview notes was 1.83 in Program A and 1.95 in Program C (the two Level 5 programs), and 1.29 in Program B and 1.44 in Program D (the two Level 3 programs).
As argued a century ago by pragmatist philosophers and symbolic interactionist sociologists, and as further articulated by CHAT, the self is not an immutable spirit hovering above the material world, merely influenced, but never fundamentally changed, by an external context. The self is an identity whose contours and contents vary with -indeed, are constituted by -the networks of people and things within which the individual is located. The hacker self reflected the structure of activity systems that would be characterized as CMM Level 1. The effect of process maturity on the software development activity system was to forge a different kind of self -a broader, more interdependent sense of one's identity. Some quotations illustrate: * "We used to be a group of hackers. If we'd have had to rebuild a system, we simply wouldn't have been able to do it because we wouldn't have had the documents. We've come a long way from that! Now we function according to a defined process and we collect data on ourselves so we can do defect causal analysis to drive continuous improvement." (A-3) * "In a small organization doing small projects, you have a lot of flexibility, but there's not much sharing. You're kind of on your own. Here, I'm just a small part of a bigger project team. So you don't do anything on your own. It's a collaborative effort." (C-13) Reviewing the analysis in the previous subsections, we can see how secondary contradictions between the subject and the other nodes contributed to the emergence of a new subject: * Object: "I think that our process -and even the paperwork part of it -is basically a good thing. My documentation is going to help the next person working on this code, either for testing or maintenance. And vice versa when I'm on the receiving end." (C-11) * Tools: "Developers want above all to deliver a great product, and the process helps us do that. What I've learned coming here is the value of a well thought-out process, rigorously implemented, and continuously improved. It will really improve the quality of the product. In this business, you've got to be exact, and the process ensures that we are. You have to get out of hacker mode!" (A-14) * More advanced model: "we had an informal training and mentoring program, and when we got serious about the CMM, we wrote it down. Writing the process down has had some great benefits. It's made us think about how we work, and that's led to improvements. For example, formalizing the training program has helped bring some outliers into conformance. And we formalized the SEPG process, and that has helped stimulate improvement." (C-15) More concretely, this new self-construal emerged through a mix of adult socialization (Kohn and Schooler, //) and "attraction-selection-attrition" (Schneider, 1987) . On the effects of the former, we have the testimony of "I can see the need now" (C-13), and "I've been converted!" (D-22) (see Conn, 2002 , for discussion of the process of socialization in another software factory). On the latter, we have comments about people who left GCC and about some who returned: * "You won't fit in well here if you don't like structure, you prefer working by yourself, you don't like getting suggestions from other people, or you don't like taking responsibility for your work and for making it better." (A-8) * "One of the main reasons I came back from the client to Program A was because I like working in a more mature organization." (A-5) * "We still have to deal with the 'free spirits' who don't believe in process.
[…] Most of them adapt, although some don't and they leave." (C-14) A new professionalism. This more interdependent self implied a corresponding mutation in the nature of people's notion of professionalism. Some aspects of professionalism were preserved, while some were significantly transformed.
On the one hand, process leveraged traditional values of professionalism, including the appeal to individual pride in the results of one's own work:
* "We appeal to people's sense of professionality, saying something like: 'We're all professionals. And as professionals, we're pretty mobile and committed to high quality work. Since I may leave here at some point, even soon, it's my duty as a professional to give the organization the documentation it needs to continue serving the customer.'" (B-5) * "Our process makes for better testing, which means earlier detection of problems, which in turn makes the life of the programmer a lot easier and avoids a lot of embarrassment." (B-15) * "You have to go through the cycle a couple of times to see that there's a payoff -especially in reducing rework. That's how you sell process: less rework, less aggravation, and less humiliation." (B-11) On the other hand, however, process seemed to encourage a mutation of professionalism. Whereas traditional conceptions of professionalism give great salience to the individual practitioner's judgment and thus to their autonomy -if not economic autonomy, at least technical decision-making autonomy -process encouraged the emergence of a more collective professional subject. This mutation is particularly significant because it appeared to moderate the traditional tension between professional autonomy and bureaucratic authority:
* "Usually people run away from audits. But amazingly, recently we've seen several projects volunteering -they want to show off their accomplishments and process capabilities." (A-15) * "The Improvement Team's work [...] made everyone realize that there are real business benefits to sharing information -instead of just worrying about your own rice bowl. I'm your customer, so I need you to understand my requirements. And the effect has been to make people interested in improving their own operations on their own, even without management being involved or pushing them." (D-12) Tensions: Interdependence versus dependence and independence. Interviews revealed two main types of tensions that could provoke resistance to the more socialized development process and thus affect the emergence of a more interdependent self.
First, due to the primary contradictions at each of the other nodes, there was the constant risk that the demand for interdependence would mutate into coercive dependence and provoke either resistance or apathy. Earlier excerpts referred to the need "to ensure that managers won't use the data punitively" (B-8) and letting go "a pretty autocratic manager" (D-5).
Second, developers sometimes clung to their independence. This was due in part to the contradiction between the collective worker and the individual wage relation. In part it was also due to the quaternary contradictions between prior socialization and the demands of the new model for a new self-construal. A change from a more independent to a more interdependent self-construal means a change in deeply ingrained cognitions and emotions. Such a change challenges the subject's prior socialization, starting from early personality formation, to education, training, and work experiences.
The overall result was an uneven process of socialization:
""We still have to deal with the 'free spirits' who don't believe in process. These are typically people who have worked mainly in small teams. It's true that a small group working by itself doesn't need all this process. But we rarely work in truly independent small teams: almost all our work has to be integrated into larger systems, and will have to be maintained by people who didn't write the code themselves. These free spirits, though, are probably only between 2% and 4% of our staff. We find some of them in our advanced technology groups. We have some in the core of our business too, because they are real gurus in some complex technical area, and we can't afford to lose them. And there are some among the new kids coming in too: many of them need convincing on this score. Most of them adapt, although some don't and they leave." (C-14) The contradictory dynamics of process improvement
Each of the preceding sections has delineated first, the dominant tendencies associated with process maturity, and second, the tensions that accompanied these tendencies and shaped their realization. An apprehension of the contradictions underlying the tensions affords us a deeper understanding of the dynamics of process maturity, its evolution over time. Exhibit 4 identifies a sequence of four moments (theoretical stages) in the development of process maturity and the corresponding tensions and contradictions.
[insert Exhibit 4 about here] Progress towards process maturity in these programs was driven, first, by the impetus provided by the conjunction of external customer pressure and the availability of a more advanced model that both customers and internal champions could advance as an industry-validated alternative. In a second moment, these circumstances prompted senior management to commit to pursuing the new model and, more concretely, to commit the management attention and the resources for the required support staff and training. Under such conditions, the third moment could unfold: organizations were able to develop and implement the mechanisms of participation that ensured developers involvement. Involvement in such a socialized activity system led in the fourth moment to more interdependent self-construals, to a more immediately socialized subjectivity.
But the forces at work embodied contradictions both at and between the nodes of the activity system, so tendencies towards socialization were accompanied by counter-tendencies. The latter effect appears to have been weaker than the former, but strong enough to make progress halting and uneven. On the one hand, the search for process maturity encouraged socialization. But on the other hand, this socialization was simultaneously assisted and retarded by (a) the competitive rivalry between firms, (b) the tension between corporate interests and the interests of its employees, (c) the tension between the collective worker and the individual wage relation, and (d) the conflicts between the new demands on employees and their prior socialization.
DISCUSSION
The social self and its socialization
The findings of this study can fruitfully be interpreted through the lenses of the literature on the "social self. " Wertsch, Tulviste, and Hagstrom (1993) constrast the Lockean, individualist self with supra-individual social self -a collective and mediated form of agency that goes "beyond the skin" (see also Taylor, 1989; Burkitt, 1991) . Bakhurst and Sypnowich (1995) similarly contrast the "Cartesian" self ("a profoundly asocial phenomenon. Each self inhabits its own subjective realm and its mental life has an integrity prior to and independently of its interaction with other people" p. 3) with the social self. A weak form of the social self thesis allows that our identities are shaped by social and cultural influences (as in mainstream social-psychology), while a strong form argues that "our very capacities to think and act are themselves socially constituted" (p. 5). Vygotsky and Dewey (e.g. 1930; 1939: 405-433) both exemplify the strong form. In Marx, we find it in the assertion that human nature is nothing but "the ensemble of the social relations" (Marx, 1975: 423) . This weakversus strong-form contrast parallels that between weak and strong forms of "situated learning" theory (Engestrom, 1999, elaborating Lave and Wenger, 1991, p. 34-5) . It also parallels the contrast between weak versions of organizational socialization, such as we see in King and Sethi (1998) , where only relatively superficial attributes are affected, and strong versions, such as in Triandis and Suh (2002) and Dannefer (1984) , where deeper features of personality are at stake.
On the strong version of the social self thesis, the self is always social, always the result of a socialization process. It was just as social, just as much the result of socialization, when it took the hacker form. The independent self of the hacker was the result of socialization under a division of labor that was (using Durkheim's terms somewhat metaphorically) "mechanistic" -each person working in parallel on a self-contained task -rather than "organic" -each person contributing only a specialized component of the whole. Even though programmers often worked in teams, no one was held responsible, nor felt responsible, for the others' progress. This independent self was reinforced by the shared norms of the profession, by educational experience, and fit the relatively primitive tools, rules, and division of labor that then characterized the software development activity system. With greater process maturity and more advanced means of production, the social character of the self is no longer merely an abstract proposition, but becomes concrete in the form of subjectivelyexperienced interdependent self-construals. The self is socialized -as it always has been -but now this socialization is not merely a remote antecedent, but becomes a lived reality.
The strong form of the social self thesis is empirically supported by Kohn and Schooler (//) statistical evidence of the effects of work organization on relatively deep psychological attributes. Their analysis, however, focuses on the effect of work autonomy on self-directedness (see also Mortimer and Lorence, 1979) . The present study finds that autonomy recedes as process maturity advances, and interdependent self-construals emerge instead of other-directedness.
The present study also points to the need to go beyond generic concepts of interdependence. In the present case, the professional orientation of developers appears to promote the distinctively modern form of interdependence, a form which preserves a certain individual autonomy even within growing interdependence. This apparently paradoxical mix can be clarified by invoking the two-dimensional characterization of culture and values articulated by Triandis and others (see Triandis and Gelfand, 1998) . On one dimension, interdependence and collectivism are contrasted with independence and individualism. And on the other dimension, "horizontal" cultures and low power-distance are contrasted with "vertical" cultures and high power-distance. The type of self-construals engendered by high-maturity software development organizations would appear to be more collectivist but simultaneously low on power distance and relatively egalitarian -"horizontalcollective." (A similar idea is expressed in the view that individualism and collectivism are orthogonal constructs and the new subject scores high on both: see discussion in Oyserman et al. 2002: 8 , and other contributors to that issue; also Kagitcibasi, 1997 : 20 on the "autonomous-related" self.) Such a self-construal provides a less subservient form of other-directedness, a form of caring. (On the social self thesis and other-directedness, see Livingston, 2000 .) Viewed developmentally, one might characterize this orientation as representing a dialectical synthesis (transcendence) of the contradiction between traditional community and the modern autonomous individual, in what Hirschhorn (//) calls the "post-modern" self.
The future of software development.
The analysis of the contradictions of this activity system has the benefit of bringing to the foreground the more likely scenarios for future development. Reviewing the causal chain analyzed in Exhibit 4, several trends appear likely.
First, considering the huge effect of the customer's commitment to process on internal process maturity and the benefits of maturity that accrue to service providers, we might anticipate more efforts in the future to evangelize and train customers in the benefits of process.
Second, given the performance benefits of process maturity, we should expect to see growing expenditures on support staff such as QA and PE. Given the inevitable increase in documentation burden associated with process discipline, we might expect to see growing investment in process automation. We should also expect more efforts to streamline the process itself to alleviate the documentation burden, in particular for small-scale, low-risk tasks. (SEI already has developed stripped down versions of the CMM for individual and team use.) Third, if participation is a key success factor, we might expect that higher-maturity software development organizations will over time come to measure and manage more actively the associated activities. In the particular, participation in the Tailoring Cycle, the suggestion process, and the Lessons Learned process seem likely targets for further process and performance improvement.
Finally, given the challenge of socializing for new self-construals, we can hypothesize the development organizations pursuing process maturity will devote more attention to the "soft" sides of process (culture, leadership, strategic vision) as distinct from its "hard" side (tools, systems, procedures).
Overall, my analysis highlights the complex, multifaceted nature of the organizational changes needed to achieve process maturity. Inertia therefore militates against maturity. In the ecology of the software industry, we would expect this inertia to be lower and incentives for change to be greatest (a) where customers can demand quality and reliability, thus (b) in the services segment rather than the pre-packaged products segment of the software industry, (c) where clients are bigger and more quality sensitive, and (d) where competition is robust. Microsoft at Level 5? Not likely (see Cusumano and Shelby,//). We would also expect maturity to be easier to achieve among new than among established firms: the proportion of young Indian software service organizations among the acknowledged CMM Level 5 organizations is indeed striking (see the list of Level 4 and 5 organizations at http://www.sei.cmu.edu).
CHAT
This study has given us an opportunity to assess the strengths of cultural-historical activity theory. In its attention to the mutual constitution of subject and context, CHAT can usefully be compared to several other approaches with similar ambitions.
CHAT can be compared to symbolic-interactionism (e.g. Strauss et al. 1985 ) and ethnomethodological analysis (e.g. Suchman, 1987) . By showing how people make sense of and act in their world, these latter lenses help us see how subjective identities are shaped by intersubjective networks. However, while these perspectives allow us to see more clearly the interconnection of subject and context, and while they point heuristically in the direction of the network of relations that make up this context, they give the notion of context no internal theoretical structure. The salient features of context are themselves entirely emergent and context-dependent (Lave, 1993; Nardi, 1996) . Moreover, by focusing on the network on concrete relations, these approaches downplay the role played by actors' cultural-historical heritage in shaping interactions. While these may not be big handicaps for micro studies of individual behavior and small groups, research on the activity of larger collectivities and on organizations needs a more theoretically elaborated notion of context. CHAT proposes one.
Structuration theory (Giddens,//) also warrants consideration here (see applications by Barley, 1986; ; Orlikowski,//). Structuration theory's strength is to pose so clearly the problem of the mutually constitution of structure (context) and agency (subject). It is less helpful, however, in helping us trace how that mutual constitution is accomplished in a given work activity. It teases apart actor and structure, and teases apart too the dimensions (domination, legitimation, signification) of each, without a theory of how they come together. The weakness is perhaps due to the fact that structuration theory has no determinate unit of analysis (unless it is sociological theory itself). CHAT by contrast focuses on the activity as a unit of analysis, and can thus turn structuration theory "inside out," by beginning with the assumption that structure and agency are given together in the world, in activity (Lave, 2001, p. 3) .
CHAT is a powerful conceptual tool to help us understand the nature and genesis of the new, more interdependent form of the self. Whereas Singelis and Brown (1995) present a model in which the aggregate culture context (notably, its collectivism vs individualism) shapes individual values (notably, interdependent vs. independent self-construals), CHAT shows us how this broader context interacts with the specific context created in the development activity system to form new self-construals. CHAT alerts us in particular to the role played by the massive advance in technology (tools in the form of integrated development environments, integrated databases, and workflow systems) and specialized organizational structures (division of labor) and formalized procedures (rules).
In these ways, CHAT allows us to give more theoretical structure to Elias's (2000) concept of "figuration." Elias showed how the modern, "civilized" self emerged as the subjective counterpart to a more interdependent form of society that emerged under the impact of political centralization and economic transformation in the late medieval period. The present study can be read as extending Elias's reasoning into the workplace and extending his chronology of civilization into the "late modern" period. (Zuboff, //, pursues a similar intent; see also van Iterson et al., 2002.) 
CONCLUSION
The empirical motivation for the present study was to understand the implications of bureaucratization for technical-professional work through an analysis of CMM Level 5 software factories. The theoretical motivation was to articulate a framework that could lead us to a richer understanding of the evolution of work and thus help us understand the evolution of forms of organization.
My empirical research has several obvious limitations. It is based on a sample of only four units of a single company. These units were focused on large-scale, complex systems for government clients. My conclusions regarding workers' experience of work -and a fortiori the claims about self-construals -remain to be tested by more extensive sampling and surveying. Its analysis of the way the various elements of the activity system interact to foster new identities needs to be tested through close-range ethnographic research.
But insofar as a case study can point us in exciting research directions, the present study suggests that CMM Level 5 may indeed be viable from both a business and a human point of view. This in turn suggests that future research should continue to explore the enabling bureaucracy form of organization and the corresponding subjective experiences of work.
Marx contrasted the isolation of individuals and communities in traditional society with the growing interdependence fostered by capitalist development. He saw capital's civilizing mission to abolish "rural idiocy" (Marx, 1959: 11) and "craft idiocy" (Marx, n.d., p. 161 ) -where the term idiocy preserves both its colloquial sense and the meaning from the Greek, "idiotes," denoting an isolated, asocial individual. With capitalist development, "In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence" (Marx, 1959: 11) . Private, parochial selves are socialized (see Cohen, 1974) . This socialization of the forces of production -including our cognitive capabilities -is distinct from the socialization of the relations of production represented by nationalization. Indeed, Marx saw the intensifying contradiction between, on the one hand, the growing socialization of the forces of production and, on the other hand, the persistence of private ownership in the relations of production as the defining law of development of capitalism, leading ultimately to socialization in the nationalization sense. Notwithstanding doubts many have about the final outcome, the evolution of software development described here -an uneven development path leading beyond what we might call "hacker idiocy" -suggests that this contradiction continues to shape the evolution of work.
APPENDIX 1: Interviewees
Unless otherwise indicated, roles are non-managerial, although some are "leads" responsible for small teams but without formal managerial authority. Managers are responsible for specific projects or staff functions (such as QA or Development), or for whole programs.
Program
Id Customer pressure created a quaternary contradiction between the demands of customers and the established software development activity system. The CMM claims to represents a More Advanced Model of the software development activity. It was the fruit of a collaborative effort by numerous industry experts to define a way beyond the chaos characteristic of large-scale system development. The CMM's endorsement by powerful actors within these units opened a tertiary contradiction with established approaches to the management of software development.
In some programs, external pressures were not consistent. Some customers did not believe in the importance of process. Or they said they did, but then were unwilling to fund the corresponding activities or to respect the corresponding discipline. Under these conditions, it was difficult if not impossible to build process maturity.
The Outcome of the development process was a market-mediated exchange with the customer. Efforts to coordinate this exchange were in contradiction with the fundamentally anarchic, uncoordinated character of the market (the primary contradiction at the Outcome node).
Commitment
External pressure encouraged but did not guarantee a corresponding internal management commitment. Process improvement required considerable resources, in the form of specialized staff. It also required senior management time and attention, particularly if CMM ratings efforts were going to serve as a means of improving the real process of software development, as distinct from merely developing a facade of documentation that employees did not actually use in
Once powerful actors recognized the CMM as a More Advanced Model, it became a scaffolding for improving the process. In a first moment, this led to the development of new Tools and to an expansion of the Object expressed in the need for more documentation.
In some cases, internal management commitment wavered. Under the pressures of schedule and profitability, funding for the requisite specialized staff was not always available, and management was not always willing to live by the discipline of process. Sometimes senior management's goals in process improvement efforts gave disproportionate weight to the symbolic benefits of certifying formal procedures relative to the technical benefits of rationalizing real work practices.
The Object of this activity system is internally contradictory: it is both to create great software (the use-value aspect) and to make a profit (the exchange-value aspect). This contradiction is expressed, first, in the tension experienced at the Object node between management's commitment to using the CMM for technical (learning) purposes and the pressures on management to maximize profits by using the CMM for purely symbolic purposes. their work.
3. Participation Given sufficient external impetus and internal commitment, process maturity required extensive participation by developers. An autocratic approach would have been counter-productive (in terms of the quality of the process) and fraught with conflict.
In a second moment, these changes in Tool and Object induced changes in all the other objective elements of the activity system: Division of Labor (requiring new staff functions), Rules (defining a comprehensive set of procedures), and Community (requiring a broader set of more collaborative relations).
Participation encounters limits in managers' commitment to meeting profit and schedule constraints. It also encounters limits in the individual versus collective goals of developers.
This use-value/exchange-value contradiction was also expressed in the tension between management's commitment to participation -a key condition for effective process disciplineand managers' commitment to maintain the firm's profitability. This contradiction was experienced at: * the Tool node, in frustration with inadequate investment in automation and simplification; * the Community node, in limits to participation; and * the Division of Labor node, in frustration with lack of specialist support.
Socialization
Given sufficient external impetus, internal commitment, participation opportunities, process discipline of the kind found at higher CMM levels had a profound effect on the subjective experience of development work. Employees certainly relinquished a great deal of personal autonomy; but developers often felt that this personal loss was outweighed by a greater sense of collective efficacy.
These changes in all the objective elements of the activity system created secondary contradictions between them and the old, hacker form of the subjective element. These contradictions tended to be resolved by the progressive transformation of the Subject, evolving towards a more interdependent self.
Staff sometimes resisted the shift to more interdependent roles when it conflicted with their individual interests as wage-earners or with the self-construals created by prior childhood or adult socialization.
The socialization of subjective identities encountered limits: * in the contradiction between the developer's status as individual wage-laborer and their membership in the collective workerreflecting the primary contradiction at the Community node, * and in the quaternary contradiction between the attraction of an interdependent self-construal and the weight of prior socialization.
